Kerry-Lugar bill — a critique

Jus days before the US President Barack Hussain Obama will be signing the Kerry-Lugar bill thus turning it into law, Pakistan’s political parties have woken up to the problems that it may pose — a late awakening to say the least. For the past one year, the controversial contents of the Kerry-Lugar bill have been widely known. Equally, in the recent months, it was clear that the House and Senate were not quite biting into Pakistani criticism of the bill. Throughout this period, the government seems to have made no transparent attempt to force a change in the text of the bill. The issues that the text of the bill raised and ones that were to negatively affect the Pakistan-US bilateral relationship were neither discussed in any cabinet meeting, defence committee of the cabinet nor in the parliament. Even the opposition, other than making rhetorical statements regarding the bill never brought up the issue properly.

Government attempts were made at an individual level – for example, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Washington, Hussain Haqqani — to lobby for change in the bill. However, such attempts did not really help. The government argues that the removal of the words ‘India’ and ‘A Q Khan’, through Pakistan’s lobbying, from the text must be appreciated. Other relative ‘pluses’ in the bill , government representatives argue, include the bringing down of the level of certification, on the conditionalities clause, from the president to secretary of state. From Pakistan’s perspective, this is an inconsequential change as long as the certification clauses remain. Also we are told that the waiver clause means that the US President can waive conditions. Yes, but those conditions will be waived in US’s national interest, and not when Pakistan needs it, as was done in the case of the Pressler Amendment.

On the removal of the demand that the US government has “direct access” to A Q Khan, the fact is that it has been replaced by a wider net of “direct access to Pakistani national associated with such networks.” Significantly, the bill goes beyond supplier networks and factors in involved in “networks relating to acquisition of nuclear weapons related materials.” This could include those working to acquire nuclear technology for Pakistan’s own nuclear programme.

Similarly, the conditionality on combating terrorism goes into intrusive details of what Pakistan is required to do. Pakistan’s battle against terrorism cannot be designed according to Washington, New Delhi and Kabul’s threat perception. The bill essentially declares Pakistan the hub of terrorism that has hit the entire region and puts the onus of fighting terrorism on Pakistan.

The strategic plan mentioned in the bill highlights Pakistan as the hub of terrorism in the region by stating that US President Obama will, along with Delhi and Kabul, side with Islamabad on its counter-terrorism policy. Clearly instead of dealing with the problem and the causes simultaneously to make headway in regional cooperation and fighting terrorism, the bill essentially pampers the Indian position on terrorism. Such a bill encourages India to continue with its rejectionist approach to bilateral dialogue.

As for democracy, if the bill had stated aid cut-off in case of a coup, it would have been an acceptable clause but to assign to Washington the role of monitoring if the Pakistan army is interfering in the country’s judicial and democratic process is unacceptable. The issue is genuine but the mandate illegitimate.

Another interesting defence for the bill came from the deputy chief of the US embassy who said that the conditionalities only apply to military aid. Whatever the internal power dynamics, Pakistan should be one unit as it engages with external powers. Hence, the opposition to such extreme conditionalities is unacceptable whether applied to military or economic aid. The bill can also trigger a new round of potentially destabilising power dynamics within Pakistan. Ultimately viewed from Pakistan’s internal power dynamics, the bill also reflects the civil-military trust deficit. The widely held view among opposition parties and security institutions is that a section of the ruling political leadership went along with, if not actually encouraged, the inclusion of the conditionalities that target Pakistan’s security institutions and policies.

There are indeed lingering problems within Pakistan’s internal power structure — its security policy faces road bumps and the chronic problem of often unaccountable and non-transparent exercise of executive and bureaucratic authority aggravates the crisis of governance. However, the message to all of Pakistan’s foreign friends during the 2007 Peoples’ Movement was that a home-grown movement for democracy was the only legitimate way to rid the country of the curse of military rule. Indeed, in 2007 Washington’s view of General Pervez Musharraf’s indispensability in leading the Pakistan front on the war on terror had trumped its concerns for its democracy; as had been the case in the 60s and 80s when Washington supported two military dictators. In 2007, the people of Pakistan charted their own democratic journey. Aid bills cannot do that.

Similarly, in the security arena, external diktat mostly works. Only local players can legitimately contest over competing threat perceptions. External players at best can share their wisdom on security matters. The arm twisting delivers results only when a blundering state becomes vulnerable, as Pakistan did during Kargil. Threat perceptions, often grounded in a potpourri of historical facts, myths and fears are not susceptible to arm-twisting or counter-threats. Hard work on bilateral relationships which yields increased cooperation, progress towards resolution of outstanding problems and trust building, can alter threat perceptions.

Aid bills also can’t dictate the direction and development of Pakistan’s critical military security asset, that is, its nuclear programme. That will be determined by strategic developments in the region. The attempt to curtail Pakistan’s nuclear programme by disallowing it to use its own funds that may be untied from projects that US aid may fund is a non-starter way of influencing a state’s security policies.

The onus now is on Pakistan’s legislature, the national assembly and senate. As custodians of the national interest of a sovereign state, these elected representatives must pass a unanimous resolution on the bill. While appreciating the objectives laid out, the resolution must firmly yet calmly enumerate the unacceptable portions of the bill.

The operative aspect of the resolution should be that in keeping with the demands of Pakistan’s national interests and with the requirements of a responsible member of the international community, the parliament and Government of Pakistan will remain committed to four national goals as reflected in Pakistan’s policies and laws. One to parliamentary democracy, two to fighting terrorism, three to non-proliferation and four to establishing good relations on the basis of mutual interest and respect with its neighbours, especially Afghanistan and with India.

The resolution must also reiterate the basic principles of sustainable bilateral relations including non-interference, sovereignty, autonomy and mutual respect. The resolution must recognise the United States as an important friend and ally, acknowledge the help it has given in the past and acknowledge its desire, as reflected in the Kerry-Lugar bill, to help Pakistan in future. Finally, the resolution must state that while Pakistan values its relationship with the US, its parliament will be constrained to advise the government to decline US support given the existing conditions.

The ball is now in the court of Pakistan’s elected legislators. As they formulate a response they must recognise that if Pakistan faces a financial crunch, the United States faces a strategic one. For the US to walk away from Pakistan is a virtual impossibility at this juncture. It is far more unaffordable for them since Pakistan occupies more than 50 per cent of the space in their strategic calculation. Meanwhile $1.5 billion accounts for roughly three per cent of Pakistan’s federal and provincial annual budgets.

If Pakistan’s legislators are able to rise to the occasion and craft a consensus response to the Kerry-Lugar bill, they will have proved their worth as men and women who are capable of promoting and protecting the interests and dignity of the citizens of the country. Otherwise, whether democracy or dictatorship, Pakistan’s parliament is merely a rubber stamp which follows the will of a handful of individuals who exercise their authority overlooking constitutionally defined institutional mechanisms like the Cabinet, defence committee the parliament.