Little time and few choices

AS Lahore reels from the shock and horror of yet another vicious attack, Pakistan has to brace for more such violence from the likes of Baitullah Mehsud.

He and his fellow killers have repeatedly shown that they have no compunction in taking innocent (and usually Muslim) lives.

If any good can possibly come from such terrorist acts, it is to further unmask these murderers. For far too long, there has been unnecessary confusion about their means and goals. To a large extent, this ambiguity was caused by the army’s legitimisation of jihadi outfits. Used to further the establishment’s agenda in Kashmir, India and Afghanistan, they were allowed to recruit and raise funds openly. In many simple people’s minds, they were heroes.

But ever since Fazlullah and his father-in-law Sufi Mohammad were allowed to take over Swat, the country has been able to watch these thugs in action. Once allowed free rein in a peaceful, settled area, they have beheaded, flogged and slaughtered unarmed men and women. Many of these atrocities have been widely reported by the media. And as the flood of displaced people flees, many have recounted their tales of horror under the Taliban.

Earlier, many Pakistanis ascribed the actions of these killers to America’s ‘war on terror’, defending the Taliban by saying that they were reacting to western forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s support for this operation. Some of us have been roundly abused for arguing that the war against these extremists was, first and foremost, our own battle for survival.

Even today, there are voices that suggest that if western forces were to pull out of the region, things would somehow return to normal. They ignore the fact that even before 9/11 (an attack, let us not forget, that was planned and launched from Afghan soil), the situation was far from normal. A full-fledged civil war raged in Afghanistan in which Pakistan covertly supported the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Jihadi outfits like the Jaish-i-Mohammad sent terrorists into Indian-held Kashmir. Within Pakistan, Sunni groups routinely targeted Shias.

Supporting this terror network were allegedly the ISI and the army. Even when Musharraf made his famous u-turn in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the establishment made a clear distinction between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Members of the former were scooped up and handed over to the Americans, while the latter were treated as distant relatives in distress. Rather than being seen as our enemies, they were viewed as potential allies who, while presently out of favour, could be useful again.

However, this policy of duplicity and ambiguity could not be sustained for long. As the Taliban sought to establish their control over large swathes of the tribal areas, our American allies began putting pressure on Musharraf to act against them. Reluctantly, the army launched a few half-hearted operations and suffered heavy losses. Emboldened by their success, militant groups ventured deeper into Pakistan, attempting to terrorise people into supporting them.

Soon after the 2008 elections, Swat was pushed to the brink. A panicky ANP government in the NWFP felt it had no military support and practically ceded Swat. And here the Taliban made a cardinal error. Instead of offering the people of Swat a decent government that could have served as a model and attracted others, they went on a rampage and confirmed our worst suspicions about their intentions and their capability.

But their incompetence and their cruelty should have come as no surprise. After all, Taliban rule in Afghanistan hardly created a heaven on earth. Even the slightly less repressive Islamic government that ruled the Frontier province for five years brought little peace or prosperity. In their longing for the perfect ‘Islamic’ government, people often forget that the fundamentalists who make up these parties and groups are barely literate, and have no understanding of the modern world. To expect them to master the intricacies of administration and economics is to expect the impossible.

And yet it would be a huge mistake to assume that this yearning for the perfect Islamic model has no rational basis. Crushed by poverty, millions of Muslims around the world heed the siren call of the mythical golden era of early Islam. Secular and Islamic governments in many Muslim countries are notoriously corrupt and repressive. By neglecting the most basic elements of decent governance, despotic kings, generals and politicians have alienated their own people and pushed them into the arms of extremist groups.

As the recent suicide attack in Lahore shows, our cities cannot be defended against such acts of terrorism. If the police headquarters and the ISI office cannot be guarded, how can our citizens expect protection? Clearly, Baitullah Mehsud does not expect to pay a price for his repeated strikes against ordinary Pakistanis. But why is he not being targeted by our commandos? Why can’t our highly trained Special Services Group go after him? Until the leaders of these terror groups feel the heat, they will go on launching their audacious attacks with impunity.

Even when extremists are arrested, they languish in jail for a while before being released. In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan arrested several Jamaatud Dawa activists after an initial period of denial. Having acted under huge international pressure, Pakistan has done little to take the process to its logical conclusion. Apart from arousing Indian suspicions about our intentions, we also reassure these extremists that no action will be taken against them.

It all comes down to political will. And this is linked closely to the kind of state we wish to become. Do we see our future as a country perpetually teetering on the brink, wracked by endless extremist terror and economic crises? Or do we wish to join the rest of the world as a modern, prosperous nation? The choice is still ours to make, but unless we act swiftly, the likes of Baitullah Mehsud will snatch it from us.