Political leaders need to recognise that their primacy in the political domain depends on their ability to deal with their differences in the democratic framework of dialogue and accommodation. If they project their demands in ‘either-or’ terms and use street agitation to pursue their agenda, they will lose the initiative
The first year of democratic governance in Pakistan has exposed, once again, political incoherence and the two main parties’ poor capacity for crisis management. Other leaders found it difficult to convince the PPP and the PMLN to moderate their disposition towards each other.
Pakistan returned from the brink of a major political breakdown on March 16, 2009 mainly because of factors external to a normal functioning democracy. The Pakistan Army played the key role in defusing tensions by encouraging the PPP-led federal government to reinstate Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and other deposed judges. This amicable resolution of the problem was supported by “friendly advice” from the United States and other allies.
The top brass of the army has shown that it can bring into play its institutional clout to moderate the political feuds and influence the direction of politics. If anything, the army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, has demonstrated that the army is a formidable political player even when not in power.
The army’s moderating role from the sidelines helped improve its image in the domestic context. Most political commentaries and public statements appreciated the army chief’s role. The PMLN members of the Punjab provincial assembly passed a resolution on March 18 appreciating the role of the army in resolving the political stalemate.
At the international level, the Pakistan army is now viewed as critical to political stability and continuity in Pakistan, in addition to its role in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency.
However, the domestic political consensus is decidedly in favour of continuation of the democratic political order and political forces are opposed to direct assumption of power by the military. Similarly, the international community supports the civilian democratic dispensation in Pakistan while acknowledging the military as an institution critical to political order, stability and counterterrorism.
The army was alarmed by the return of Pakistani politics to its traditional mode of free-for-all confrontation between the opposition and the government. Once again the political class wanted to settle issues in the streets, side-stepping the established democratic framework. Such a state of affairs could hardly provide the much-needed political support to the army’s efforts to cope with the security challenges on the eastern border with India in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attack and the insurgency and terrorism in the western borderlands adjoining Afghanistan.
In the bid to settle their scores, feuding political leaders were not willing to take into account the implications of their behaviour for internal and external security issues. The most disturbing development was that the PMLN leadership was not only calling upon the people to take on the government in the streets but also appealed to civil servants to defy the government.
The injurious implications of political confrontation on the economy were another consideration that influenced the army chief’s efforts to defuse the situation. The military gets the second biggest share of the national budget and internal political turmoil makes it difficult for the economy to cope with the military’s high demands on national resources. International economic and military assistance is also sensitive to internal political conditions. Donors are likely to hold back or slow down assistance if instability becomes endemic.
The most perturbing scenario for the army chief was the deployment of his troops to protect the beleaguered civilian government when protesters led by Nawaz Sharif and others reached Islamabad. The top commanders do not want to be viewed as supporting one set of political leaders or another as they have an extremely poor estimation of civilian political leaders and prefer an autonomous political role.
The top brass discussed the domestic political situation in the meeting of the Corps Commanders on March 5. Some of the participants expressed strong concern about the possibility of political confrontation. The army chief had his first meeting the prime minister on March 11, followed by two separate meetings with the president and the prime minister on March 13 to discuss a workable plan to end the political crisis.
The most crucial meetings took place on March 15 when the army chief met with the president and the prime minister separately and then held a joint meeting hours before the prime minister addressed the nation, announcing the restoration of all deposed judges. General Kayani also communicated with Nawaz Sharif and Aitzaz Ahsan on March 15 to defuse the situation.
The army chief’s moderating role from the sidelines reflects the disposition of the army since General Kayani assumed office on November 28, 2007. He has made conscious efforts to step back from active political participation and adopt a non-partisan professional posture, emphasising that the military’s interaction with other institutions of the state will be determined by the constitution.
The causes of the military’s reorientation since 2007-08 are beyond the scope of this article. The civilian government and the military are cooperating with each other in counter-terrorism and policy management. This has given more space to the civilian political leadership and the military ample opportunity to protect its professional and corporate interests from the sidelines.
The military’s major concern is to retrieve its reputation with the common person, which was damaged over the last two years of the Musharraf regime. This rehabilitation is possible only by avoiding direct involvement in governance and politics.
However, the military is ready to protect its professional and corporate interests through lobbying, persuasion and, at times, discreetly communicating its displeasure to civilian government in non-ambiguous terms. It is averse to unilateral civilian decision-making on matters that are perceived by the top brass as in its professional and corporate domain.
It was thus not surprising that the army leadership rejected the civilian government’s effort to bring the ISI under its control. Similarly, it took exception to the prime minister’s unilateral announcement to send the ISI chief to India in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attack.
In December 2008, the civilian bureaucrat holding the top administrative slot (Secretary) in the Ministry of Defence was replaced with a retired lieutenant-general on the recommendation of the army headquarters. This revived the practice of appointing retired senior army officers to this position.
The moderating role of the army chief in the March crisis is understandable because the crisis could have undermined internal political and economic stability and threatened the army’s interests. It could have created a situation in which the army would have found it difficult to use its clout from the sidelines.
Political leaders need to recognise that their primacy in the political domain depends on their ability to deal with their differences in the democratic framework of dialogue and accommodation. If they project their demands in ‘either-or’ terms and use street agitation to pursue their agenda, they will lose the initiative. The facilitation by the army chief helped the government overcome the crisis. One wonders why political leaders cannot solve their problems on their own.
