Rethinking the composite dialogue

Since the victory of the Congress Party in the Indian parliamentary elections last May, the new government of Manmohan Singh has been sending more positive signals on a dialogue with Pakistan. When Delhi put a “pause” on the composite dialogue after the terrorist attacks in Bombay last November, it set two conditions for a resumption of the talks: that Pakistan should (a) bring to justice those responsible for the attacks and (b) dismantle the “infrastructure of terrorism” in the country. After the formation of the new government, India has continued to demand action by Pakistan against the perpetrators of the terrorist atrocity but without expressly making it a precondition for dialogue.

The new line now seeks to combine the demand for tough action against militant groups with a conciliatory message of engagement and amity if Pakistan complies. It was signalled by Manmohan in his speech in the newly elected parliament on June 9 in which he said that India was ready to go “more than half way” if Islamabad cracked down on militants and that peace with Pakistan was in India’s “vital interest.” But to reassure sceptics at home, Manmohan staged a well-rehearsed drama at Yekaterinburg reminding Zardari that his “mandate” was limited to discussing what Pakistan had done to stop terrorist attacks against India.

This declaration of willingness to take steps for peace with Pakistan, like Vajpayee’s “hand of friendship” speech in Srinagar in April 2003, was meant to pave the way for restarting the dialogue that India itself had unilaterally called off. It was also a tacit admission that the policy of hurling threats at Pakistan had been counterproductive. India has not as yet agreed to resume the composite dialogue but only to a meeting of the foreign secretaries to discuss action taken by Pakistan to stop terrorism. This meeting is now expected to take place at Sharm-el-Shaikh shortly before that of the top leaders of the two countries at the same venue during the NAM Summit in mid-July.

It is unlikely that the Sharm-el-Shaikh meetings will lead to an immediate resumption of the composite dialogue. The next opportunity would come at the UN General Assembly session next September. As always happens in Pakistan-India negotiations, there is likely to be considerable diplomatic sparring before an agreement is reached. Before agreeing to a comprehensive dialogue, India would without doubt like Pakistan to take some further steps in prosecuting those implicated in the Bombay attacks. India would also maintain pressure on Pakistan bilaterally and internationally, after the dialogue is resumed, for action against organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad.

The major reason why India has decided to resume dialogue with Pakistan in the not-too-distant future is their assessment that Zardari’s personal agenda on Pakistan-India relations and India’s long-held designs for the region are largely in sync. At Yekaterinburg Zardari made history by becoming the only Pakistani leader not to raise Kashmir at a meeting with his Indian counterpart. He is also keen to meet Washington’s demand that Pakistan should shift more of its army from the eastern to the western border. India’s National Security Adviser Narayanan was right when he said in August last year that Zardari, then the front runner for the presidency, “is very friendly to India.” Narayanan lamented at the same time that Zardari may not be able to deliver on his promise of good ties with India.

India has therefore decided to build up Zardari’s capacity to “deliver” – with Washington’s help. Indian officials and commentators have indicated that by engaging with the civilian government in a dialogue, they wish to boost its credibility in the face of “military hawks” in Pakistan. India’s concern of course is not with strengthening civilian rule, but with helping a ruler who is “very friendly to India.” After all, India was very comfortable dealing with Musharraf’s military dictatorship, once he abandoned the Kashmir cause in 2004. Narayanan in fact said in an interview in February this year that the Musharraf regime was better for India than the civilian government.

Zardari’s credibility, which India would like to boost, is threatened not by “military hawks” but by the fact that he came into power under an act of political engineering masterminded in Washington with the aim of installing a government that would continue to serve its interests. Even worse, since coming into power, he has been giving unqualified support to Washington’s policies in the region, which are deeply unpopular in Pakistan.

In an article in this newspaper on 23 June, Maleeha Lodhi, who served ably as Musharraf’s ambassador in Washington and London for eight years, wrote that India might now try to wriggle out of meaningful negotiations on Kashmir. She need have no such fears. Quite the contrary. In fact the biggest gain made by India while the composite dialogue proceeded has been the near-agreement on Kashmir worked out through back channel talks. Under this arrangement, the territorial status quo in Kashmir would be made permanent in return for such dubious and reversible “concessions” by India as soft borders, “self-rule” and the establishment of a joint council to discuss matters affecting the whole of the state. In other words, Pakistan would recognise India’s occupation of Kashmir and the people of Kashmir would be sold into permanent slavery. India is now keen to restart the composite dialogue not because it wants to wriggle out of this deal, as Maleeha Lodhi suspects, but because it would like to finalise it.

When the composite dialogue was started in 2004, the Pakistani and Indian objectives were quite different. From the Pakistani perspective, the purpose was to link progress on issues such as trade, economic relations and cultural exchanges with progress on the core issue of Kashmir. This was unrealistic to begin with and it has not worked that way. India, on the other hand, gave priority to confidence-building measures and other largely cosmetic steps, while discussions on Kashmir took place through the backchannel.

Five years after the process was started, Pakistan needs to take stock of progress made. The balance sheet is by no means in Pakistan’s favour. The biggest item on the debit side has been Musharraf’s backchannel deal on Kashmir. Fortunately, it is not too late to repudiate it. Pakistan does not have to do it with fanfare. It is enough not to revive the backchannel. At the same time, the slow-moving composite dialogue may be allowed to continue. It has largely run its course but may have a marginal value in keeping open the channels of communication.

Pakistan should also stop urging Washington to mediate in Kashmir. Any intervention by Washington would be for a solution that formalises the de facto division of the state. Now is not the time to negotiate on this issue. Instead Pakistan should revert to the demand for a solution based on the Security Council resolutions which Musharraf abandoned in 2004. The prime minister restated Pakistan’s traditional position in the Azad Kashmir Council on June 9. But that is not enough. He should do it at the UN General Assembly session this September.

The Kashmir freedom movement was doing well enough before Musharraf launched the Kargil adventure and would have been nearer its goal if he had not committed this monumental folly. The mass demonstrations in Kashmir last year on the grant of land to the Amarnath shrine and this year after the rape and murder of two young Kashmiri women allegedly by Indian soldiers show that the spirit of azadi is getting stronger and stronger among the new generation of Kashmiris and cannot be suppressed forever.

It is shocking that Pakistan’s support to this protest against Indian occupation has been so muted. Pakistan should come out openly in support of peaceful protest by the Kashmiri people and forcefully raise the issue of human rights violations bilaterally with the major countries and at international forums. The path to freedom for the Kashmiris lies not through the composite dialogue but through peaceful demonstrations and international pressure.