India’s half-step to talks

There is no doubt about it. India climbed down at Sharm el-Sheikh. It had earlier made a dismantling of the “infrastructure of terrorism” and the prosecution of those accused of involvement in the Mumbai atrocity a precondition for the resumption of the suspended composite dialogue. In the Joint Statement issued at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, India backed down from this linkage. This is a vindication of Pakistan’s position.

For Manmohan Singh it has not been easy to sell this change domestically. Even the External Affairs Ministry mandarins are said to be unhappy. Hence the convoluted semantics in which Manmohan Singh has entangled himself. Shortly after the summit meeting he told reporters that the composite dialogue could not begin until the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in mumbai were brought to book, contradicting the de-linking of the two issues in the joint statement.

Then, in a statement in the Indian Parliament the next day, Manmohan Singh tried to stand on its head the commitment made at Sharm el-Sheikh and laid out a sequence which amounted to re-linking the two. Action on terrorism, Manmohan said in a remarkable twist, should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and therefore could not await other developments. As for the dialogue, he left it completely open. “Whether, when and in what form we broaden the dialogue with Pakistan will depend on future developments,” Manmohan told Parliament.

All these verbal acrobatics did not save the Manmohan Singh government from some blistering attacks from the opposition BJP and sections of the media. Advani has called the joint statement a capitulation. K C Singh, a former secretary in the Indian Foreign Ministry, outdid everyone else, complaining that Manmohan Singh had betrayed the maxim that “great countries negotiate on their own terms.”

Besides the de-linking of the terrorism issue from the dialogue, another sore point with the Indian critics of the joint statement has been the reference to Balochistan, dubbed in the Indian media as the “Balochistan bungle.” Actually, the language on Balochistan was so anodyne that it is the Pakistani press that should be talking about a bungle. The relevant sentence simply speaks of unspecified “threats” rather than any interference from outside.

Similarly, it is quite incomprehensible why we agreed to the inclusion of a sentence on India’s oft-touted interest in a stable, democratic, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, when we know that Delhi is trying to destabilise Balochistan and “other areas.” At the very least, our side should have countered by a similar affirmation of interest in a democratic, secular India at peace with itself.

Despite the formal de-linking of terrorism from the dialogue, it is clear that India will maintain an effective connection between the two. The least that the Indians would like Pakistan to do before resuming the composite dialogue is that the trial of Lakhvi and the others allegedly involved in the Mumbai attack should proceed expeditiously. India will also maintain bilateral and international pressure on Pakistan to close down the “terrorist networks” that are allegedly behind attacks in Occupied Kashmir and India.

At the same time, despite Manmohan Singh’s warning in the Indian Parliament that the “whether” and “when” of a broader dialogue remain open, it can be safely predicted that, barring another major terrorist attack, the composite dialogue will start sooner rather than later. India has taken the first half-step at Sharm el-Sheikh. It cannot indefinitely delay the next half-step if Pakistan takes action to prosecute those who allegedly masterminded or orchestrated the Mumbai attack.

Manmohan Singh is keen to resume the dialogue because, whatever the importance of curbing terrorism following the trauma of Mumbai, India’s broader objectives towards Pakistan and in the region cannot be realised without holding talks. It is this recognition that compelled Manmohan Singh to change gear on this issue after his election victory. Since then, he has said repeatedly that he is willing to meet Pakistan “more than half way” if it cracked down on militants. The Indians have also welcomed Zardari’s admission that Pakistan nurtured terrorists in the past. Many Indian analysts who have gone beyond a simple parsing of the joint statement have also welcomed Manmohan Singh’s policy of seeking dialogue with Pakistan.

Broadly, there are four main objectives which are indirectly tied to a resumption of the composite dialogue.

First, India is keen that the talks on Kashmir held through the back channel should be resumed from the point they had reached under the Musharraf regime. In these talks, the military dictator agreed to legitimise India’s occupation of the state in all but name. India would now like Zardari to complete the sell-out of the Kashmir cause that Musharraf started.

Second, India would like that Pakistan acknowledge the role assigned to it in Afghanistan under Obama’s AfPak policy. Obama has proposed a contact group on Afghanistan and Pakistan, with India as an important member. This arrangement, which would amount to recognition of India’s hegemonic role in the region, has not yet been formalised because of Pakistan-India differences. India hopes that with a resumption of the bilateral dialogue with Pakistan, Pakistan would be more accommodating.

Third, India would like Pakistan to open the Wagah-Torkham transit route for Indian exports to Afghanistan. A transit-trade agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan is to be finalised by December and there is quiet but steady American pressure on Pakistan to open the Wagah route to India.

Fourth, India would like the liberalisation of trade, economic relations, travel and cultural exchanges with Pakistan in order to achieve the economic and cultural penetration of the country.

The suspension of the composite dialogue has held up progress on all these matters, which are close to India’s heart because they are linked to the realisation of its great-power ambitions.

Manmohan Singh hinted in his speech in Parliament that India might press for a review of the format of the composite dialogue. This issue could come up in the foreign secretaries-level talks expected in the coming weeks. Although Pakistan has indicated a preference for the existing structure, this is not likely to become a make-or-break issue.

When Pakistan and India first agreed in the Lahore Declaration of 1999 on a comprehensive dialogue, Pakistan’s main demand was that the focus should be on a resolution of the core issue of Kashmir. Since then there have been two major developments that have changed the entire context: Musharraf’s Kargil blunder and 9/11. As a result, the Kashmir freedom struggle is now viewed by the international community mostly through the prism of the international fight against terrorism. A settlement which meets the aspirations of the Kashmiri people for azadi is therefore unrealistic under the present circumstances. The only “solution” that can be achieved is a permanent division of the state along the Line of Control. This would be rejected by the Kashmiri people as well as most Pakistanis. Pakistan needs to rethink its approach. While retaining Kashmir on the bilateral agenda, Pakistan should therefore revert to the policy of raising it in the international fora and reaffirm the sanctity of UN resolutions that form the basis of Pakistan’s stand.

After Kashmir, the most important item on the agenda is peace and security. The two sides have agreed on some confidence-building measures. But India refuses to discuss any bilateral restraints on either conventional or nuclear forces. This item has therefore been more or less exhausted.

The fact that India conceded ground at Sharm el-Sheikh on the question of linkage between terrorism and the holding of a dialogue does not mean that Pakistan triumphed. The real test will be what results these talks bring when they are held. India has set clear goals for itself. Ours are more nebulous. This is particularly true on the issues of economic and cultural relations, on which Pakistan has been mostly in a reactive mode. What we need to do is to carry out a comprehensive review of our policy to determine our goals and then to measure the utility of the talks against those goals.